The links between population growth and economic performance are complex and contentious, and nowhere more so than in China. This chapter explores some of these links through the eyes of an economist, in the context of the possibility that Chinese people will respond to the Two-Child
Policy by actually having two babies now that they are allowed to. Another possibility -and a more likely one, according to a string of demographic research on the topic -suggests an alternative future in which China falls into a 'low-fertility trap', consistent with other countries in the region, including Japan and Korea. 3 A question in the background of what follows is:
would such a 'trap' really be a bad thing?
It is worth noting that the strict One-Child Policy only applied in urban areas for most of its duration (with a nationwide relaxation in 2013 allowing urban couples to have two if either of the couple was an only child themselves). Most rural people were allowed to have a second child as long as the first was a girl, and ethnic minorities (including Tibetans and Uyghurs) were exempt altogether. Reflecting these variations, the term One-Child Policy is rarely used in China, with the less dramatic 'Birth-Plan Policy' 计划生育政策 being far more common. That said, I use the terms One-and Two-Child Policy in what follows.
IN THE NEWS, by Jane Golley
The Chinese media published a wide range of news stories relating to the Two-Child Policy in 2016. Collectively, they implied that a veritable 'baby boom' is already well underway. It will take time for official statistics to confirm or deny whether this is the case (and more time still to determine whether those official statistics are accurate or not). Some examples include:
• In Linyi city in Shandong province, early education centres are developing rapidly, with annual tuition fees predicted to reach up to RMB 10,000 (AU$2,000) because of the new policy, which is expected to boost demand for children placements. The growing demand for education for children aged six and under in China's highly competitive education system is related to parents' desire for their young children to 'expand their social networks' 社交圈子大点 and to ensure that they are not 'losing at the starting line' 输在起跑线. More broadly, there have been numerous calls for expanded access to childcare and early education so that having a second child does not derail the parents' career prospects.
• Numerous articles predicted that over fifteen million babies will be delivered in China in the next five years, stimulating consumption and promoting China's economic development. (My own analysis shows the first of these claims to be true, but not the second.)
• In Shenzhen, Guangdong province, one of China's wealthiest cities, there has been a surge in demand for 'postnatal attendants' (yuesao) following the policy change. Yuesao salaries are predicted to increase rapidly to RMB 20,000-30,000 per month (AU$4,000-6,000).
These yuesao provide services that the vast majority of Chinese mothers (and indeed most parents around the world) can only dream about: including food preparation and nutrition advice for the new mother alongside postnatal care of the baby.
• By contrast, a story from Hainan stressed how the island lacks enough gynaecologists and nursing staff to cope with the expected baby boom in 2016.
• In Jiangsu province, readers were informed of the dangers of 'advanced maternal age' based on two women aged thirty-four and thirty-six -not particularly 'advanced' in the context of developed countries these days -experiencing antenatal haemorrhaging;
fortunately both mums and babies survived. From Shanghai came a related story about advanced maternal age and the increase in the number of caesareans and use of IVF.
• One article suggested that the end of the One-Child Policy would solve the problems of the Spanish dairy industry, given the Chinese appetite for foreign infant formula and milk Mao Zedong was, by contrast, a 'population optimist'. He believed that 'the more people we have, the stronger we will be' 人多力量大. single Chinese children at the bottom of the 'four-two-one' family structure (four grandparents, two parents, and one child) themselves face a significant burden in terms of supporting their parents.
Even more consequential is the contribution of the One-Child Policy to the rapid rise in gender imbalances in China in favour of males. 7 Other immeasurable costs result from the emotional fallout from not being allowed to determine the size of your family, forced abortions, and penalties for having an unauthorised second child, including their inability to enrol in school or to access the health care system.
Time for Two?
There is no doubt that China is confronting a relatively rapidly ageing population, as shown in Figure 1 rise in youth dependency would ensure that total dependency (the sum of youth and aged dependency) is higher, not lower, under the high-fertility scenario.
My ongoing research with Professor Rod
Tyers from the University of Western Australia demonstrates that China's demographic dividend may not all be in the past. show that fertility rates consistent with a Two-Child Policy would indeed contribute to higher rates of GDP growth, and a lower proportion of people over sixty-five in the Chinese population in the decades ahead, as well as providing a modest spur to domestic consumption (since children consume but don't save). Yet these impacts would amount to less than half a percent per year of GDP growth (close to the NHFPC's official estimate) and a reduction in aged dependency of only 0.03 percentage points. Furthermore, they would come at a significant cost in terms of per capita GDP, reducing its level by twenty-one percent in 2050 compared with the low-fertility alternative.
Changes in fertility patterns also have implications for the skill composition of the labour force. This, in turn, affects productivity and hence the level of investment, prices, and competitiveness across the economy.
In China, workers from rural areas tend to be less skilled than those from urban centres. During the first three decades of reform, despite the laxer Ultimately, the economic impact of the Two-Child Policy will depend on how people actually respond to it. I predict that little will change in rural China, partly because the One-Child Policy has not been strictly applied there for decades now, and also because rural incomes remain relatively low. The most often-cited reason for not wanting to have more children among rural people is that they simply can't afford them. In urban areas, anecdotal evidence suggests that time, rather than money, is the main constraint on couples contemplating a second child: the most common response I've had to the question of whether they want another is: 'No way, we don't have time'. This hunch is supported by a growing number of demographic analyses predicting that China is headed for a 'low-fertility trap', based on evidence that the most developed provinces and cities, such as Jiangsu and Shanghai, are already in one. Based on the logic presented here, this may not be such a bad thing. High saving rates, in turn, provide the funds for domestic investment and hence domestic output expansion. They also have international implications, with the excess of savings over investment fuelling China's current account surplus -basically, its excess of exports over its imports -and the US current account deficit. Indeed, Shang-jin Wei and his co-author Qingyuan Du concluded that, while 'the sex ratio imbalance is not the sole reason for global [economic] imbalances, it could be one of the significant, and yet thus far unrecognised factors'.
17 The implication was that China's sex ratio imbalance played an indirect but possibly major role in the 2008
Global Financial Crisis. We wanted to know if they were right.
Second, we considered the phenomenon of hypergamy -that is, the practice of women choosing to 'marry up' -and its implication that the least 'desirable' men would end up being unmarried, or 'excess'. Our model distinguished between skilled and unskilled workers, and between genders, so we were able to separate out the unskilled men and project how many of these would remain single depending on our assumptions about who married whom. As a result, we predicted a huge gender gap by 2030:
Will it become increasingly difficult for Chinese men to find a wife? Photo: Michemma, Flickr in the range of eighteen to forty-eight million 'excess' Chinese men potentially wanting to marry but unable to find a wife.
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Third, we considered the work of Lena Edlund and her co-authors, also from Columbia University, which linked the increase in China's sex ratio to a rise in property and violent crime. We took this link one step further and suggested that a rise in the sex ratio would decrease labour productivity (since you can't very well be productive when you're out committing crimes), especially among unskilled male workers, whose marriage rates were lowest.
To examine the future consequences of projected ongoing declines in the SRB, we ran a baseline projection for the model in which the SRB remained at current (unbalanced) levels through to 2030. We then ran simulations that projected 'gender rebalancing', by allowing the SRB to trend towards normal levels by 2030.
We found that lower Chinese household savings (the consequence of a falling SRB) would reduce funds available for investment, and therefore have a negative impact on both GDP and per capita income. This illustrated the point that gender rebalancing will exact a cost on the economy just as the imbalances of the past have had economic benefits.
Fortunately, this negative economic impact was offset by the positive impact of gender rebalancing on the reduction of crime and an increase in productivity among unskilled male workers. This, in turn, would boost investment, GDP, and per capita income. However, things could go the other way if, say, the impact on savings was bigger and that on productivity smaller than implied by both Wei and Edlund.
In sum, our modelling showed that gender rebalancing would have a fairly small impact on the Chinese economy over the time period studied -mainly because it takes time for changes in birth rates to lead to changes in the workforce. We found that global impacts were small too, which challenges Wei and Du's dramatic claim above. China's gender imbalances are nothing to be proud of, but at least we managed to show they didn't cause the Global Financial Crisis! 
Who's in Control Now?
After three and a half decades of strictly controlling the fertility decisions of its vast population, the Chinese government has now relinquished some, albeit not all, of that control. Regardless of any possible economic implications, I applaud the non-economic benefits of this shift, including the new, if incomplete liberty it affords Chinese citizens to plan and have the kind of family they desire. However, as an economist, I believe that a Two-Child Policy is not the best option for tackling either China's slowing economic growth or its ageing population. There are better ways of increasing labour productivity and labour force participation rates -for example, by extending the retirement age to sixty for women and sixty-five for men (as has now been done), as well as more complex reforms to the education, welfare, and the hukou 户口 system. Combined with low fertility, such measures would boost labour productivity and hence increase China's chances of breaking the 'middle-income trap'. contribute to a declining sex ratio at birth. Now I'm not so sure. I think it is likely that it will be the richest urban Chinese who take greatest advantage of the Two-Child Policy, particularly those whose first child was a girl. If their determination to have a son is strong enough, and laws targeting sex-selective abortion are weak enough, it is possible that the gender ratio could worsen, not improve. This is not an outcome that anyone should welcome. The government's control over highly personal decisions about family size has weakened, and that is a good thing. Its control over preventing the abortion of unwanted girls has strengthened, and so it should. parents, sixty percent are estimated to be older than thirty-five years, and fully half over forty. This has raised questions about how effective this policy shift will be in boosting China's fertility rate. It also raises questions about the impact it will have on the health and status of Chinese women in general and older women in particular.
One year after the unveiling of the Two-Child Policy, the hoped-for baby boom has been slow to materialise. One reason is that the implementation of the Two-Child Policy has been marred by delays and uncertainty. Many parents held off on a second child until they could be sure their local-or provincial-level governments had stopped fining couples for unplanned births and that maternity leave and other benefits would be available. The official total fertility rate for 2015 was China's lowest ever: 1.05 children per woman. (For comparison, the global average total fertility rate for 2010-2015 was 2.5.) This was despite the fact that more couples than ever before were given permission to have a second child before the privilege was made universal. Many parents are wary of the high economic costs of raising a second child, or have a preference for a single-child family. Whatever the reason, at the end of 2016, Chinese media was estimating that only 950,000 additional births could be attributed to the policy change.
Then there are the concerns specific to older mothers. Compared with younger women, women aged thirty years or over are significantly more likely to experience serious health issues in pregnancy. Given widespread pressure on Chinese women to give birth before thirty, Chinese hospitals may prove ill-equipped to deal with these risks as many medical professionals have not had to deal with problems associated with older women giving birth.
In addition, China has one of the highest rates of births by caesarian section in the world.
During the heyday of the One-Child Policy, close to fifty percent of Chinese women chose or were pressured into giving birth to their presumed only child by C-section, which was touted Mother and daughter Photo: Kirstin Huntley, Flickr as being safer for the child. It is also worth noting that C-sections generated more revenue for hospitals. Now, as millions of women who have delivered by C-section in the past explore the possibility of giving birth a second time, there is a shortage of medical professionals with experience handling the complications that could arise.
Many Chinese women are also wary about what a second child might mean for their professional lives. China's maternity leave policies, which permit women to take up to four months off work with full pay, already make it difficult for many women to be seen as competitive hires in a crowded marketplace. There is concern that employers will now take a potential second round of maternity leave and benefits into consideration when making decisions about hiring or promoting women of childbearing age. Relevant national and local government departments have yet to clarify whether the benefits currently extended to first-time mothers through the national insurance scheme will cover them the second time around, meaning that the Two-Child Policy might prove especially costly for employers. This directly threatens the modest successes some Chinese women have claimed in decades of struggle against gender inequality at work.
With the Two-Child Policy, Chinese women may have marginally more freedom over their reproductive choices, though only time will tell if the second-child policy will resolve some of the demographic ills it ultimately seeks to remedy. Whatever the result, however, the excesses of the One-Child Policy will continue to leave an indelible mark. Under the One-Child Policy, millions of Chinese women were persuaded or forced to be sterilised, and many more have grown older without the expectation of being permitted to have another child. The Family Planning Commission may have performed its work too well.
Three-child policy?
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